Introduction
Oliver Williamson's important contributions to the theory of vertical integration are well known and recognized. This recognition is due in part to the strong support that the empirical literature on the make-or-buy decision has found for his argument that asset specificity, resulting as it does in bilateral monopoly problems, is an important determinant of the propensity of firms to internalize certain transactions, i.e. to vertically integrate, or to make rather than buy.
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What has perhaps not been discussed or recognized to the same extent is the important role that Oliver Williamson's work on transaction cost economics has played in the study of contractual clauses that restrict one or both parties to a transaction. We use Williamson's term vertical market restrictions to denote such restrictive clauses, which include but are not limited to, the vertical restraints that have been the focus of antitrust policy. In part, we suspect that such restrictions have received less attention because, in much of the empirical work on vertical integration, the buy option that is opposed to vertical integration is not fully specified. More often than not, however, purchases and sales do not take place in spot markets but are instead governed by contracts.
Nevertheless, in this literature, contractual transactions are frequently not distinguished from spot-market interactions, and this leads to empirical analyses and conclusions that do not consider the use or effect of specific contract clauses. There are exceptions to this regularity, however, many of which are discussed below.
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There are, of course, theories other than transaction cost economics (TCE) that have been used to motivate empirical analyses of contracts and contractual restrictions. The theory of property rights is a natural candidate. However, for quite some time, that theory was considered to be simply a more mathematically grounded cousin of TCE.
Thus empirical evidence related to transaction cost arguments was often interpreted as supportive of property rights theory as well. As Williamson has remarked, however, TCE traditionally has emphasized the governance of contractual relationships ex post, whereas the assumption of costless bargaining in most of the property rights literature has meant that the action occurs ex ante, at the incentive alignment stage. 2 Moreover, Whinston has shown how the empirical implications of transaction costs and those of property rights differ in important ways. 3 This, in turn, implies that evidence should be interpreted more carefully.
Finally, for certain types of contracts, agency theory provides rather stark and clear comparative static predictions for contract clauses, implications that can be taken to data directly. Hence the empirical literature on certain types of contracts and contract restrictions found in, for example, salesforce compensation and franchising arrangements has tended to pursue implications derived from agency models.
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It is nonetheless the case that Williamson's contributions have influenced the empirical analysis of contracts generally, and vertical market restrictions more specifically, in fundamental ways. In particular, Williamson often refers to hybrids, which he defines as forms of organization that stand between markets and hierarchies, wherein he includes both franchising and various forms of alliances, and those relationships are most often supported by contracts. In fact, from early on in his writings, contracting and specific terms or conditions embedded in contracts including vertical restraints, featured prominently.
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Empirically, transaction cost economics, which predicts that the choice of contract terms will be influenced by uncertainty, complexity, and specificity, has been particularly successful in explaining certain aspects of contractual agreements, such as contract duration. Indeed early empirical studies of transaction cost arguments, including the seminal work of Joskow and of Crocker and Masten in the mid to late 1980's, examined the relationship between contract duration and asset specificity. 6 This literature showed Integration and Franchising, 31 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND ORGANIZATION 101 (1996) use transaction cost arguments to study the use of internal sales force (versus external dealers) and franchising respectively. and most importantly, bringing the theory much closer to the data.
In this paper, we review some of the empirical work on inter-firm contracts that has been inspired by Williamson's work on transaction costs and vertical restrictions.
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We organize this discussion around specific restrictions that are commonly found in contracts. We conclude with some general thoughts about how what one can learn from these studies can inform antitrust concerns regarding vertical market restrictions.
Transaction Cost Economics and Contracting Practices
In this section, we discuss empirical studies that examine certain restrictive clauses that are found in inter-firm contracts. In our discussion, we interpret restrictions broadly to include practices, such as contract duration and adjustment clauses, that govern how a contract will evolve over time, as well as more traditional vertical restraints. In particular, contracts that do not restrict duration and methods of adjustment are more flexible. Unfortunately, they are also more vulnerable to opportunism on the part of one or both parties, and that vulnerability increases as traditional concerns of TCE, such as specificity, uncertainty, and complexity, become more important.
In our discussion, we do not attempt to be exhaustive. Instead, we have chosen to focus on a small set of restrictions and to analyze those restrictions in greater depth.
Many of the studies that we discuss are concerned with the tradeoff between flexibility and freedom from opportunism that Williamson has emphasized. Some, however, test
Williamson's belief that, with the possible exception of transactions that occur in concentrated markets with strong entry barriers, contract restrictions are motivated by efficiency rather than market-power considerations. 
A. Contract Duration
The period over which a contract is binding, which can be very short or can span many decades, is an important vertical market restriction. Indeed, it obligates the parties to interact for a specific period. It is therefore natural for researchers to be interested in uncovering the determinants of duration. TCE implies that contracts will be longer when firms have more specific investments at stake, since the need to protect those investments is greater. They will be shorter, in contrast, when environments are more uncertain, since flexibility assumes greater importance in that case.
In his early papers, Joskow related the duration of contracts between US electric utilities and coal companies, which can last as little as one or as long as 50 years, to various proxies that capture the amount of relationship-specific investment, and thus quasi rent, involved. 10 He found that mine-mouth plants, which are plants that choose to locate next to coal mines with the expectation that they will obtain their coal from those mines -a classical case of site specificity -operate under much longer contracts than do other plants. Specifically, his baseline specification shows that mine-mouth contracts are on average 12 to 16 years longer. In addition, he finds that plants that use more coal and those that operate in the East rather than the West or Midwest use longer-term contracts.
He argues that the former reflects the increased difficulty in finding alternative buyers or sellers for large quantities, whereas the latter reflects differences in the types of coal 8 produced and in the production and transportation options available in the three regions.
Both of those factors influence the risk of hold up. In sum, Joskow finds strong support for the hypothesis that differences in relationship-specific investments and the potential for hold up determine the duration of electric-utility/coal contracts.
Like Joskow, in their study of natural-gas sales contracts, Crocker and Masten find that firms use longer-term contracts when they face a greater likelihood of hold up, for example, because there are fewer buyers, sellers, or transportation options. 11 The authors consider not only the benefit of long-term contracts in protecting specific assets, but also the countervailing cost of using longer-term contracts, which they associate with the loss of flexibility in dealing with unforeseen events. Consistent with their hypothesis, they find that contract duration was reduced substantially by the 1973 oil embargo, which increased the amount of uncertainty in the market for natural gas and thus the need for flexibility.
Finally, Saussier finds similar effects in his sample of coal procurement contracts for Électricité de France. 12 Moreover, those effects persist even after endogenizing the degree of asset specificity in the transaction. All these studies are thus supportive of transaction-cost determinants of procurement-contract duration. They interpret the franchisor-experience effect in terms of reduced uncertainty and explain the result regarding franchisee investment using asset-specificity arguments.
Finally, when recontracting costs are higher, due to for example transaction complexity, there is greater scope for opportunism. In other words, their analysis yields results that are consistent with those obtained in the procurement literature.
Pirrong studies the contracts used in bulk shipping ---those between shippers of goods and providers of shipping transport ---and finds that they are of longer duration when markets are thin and carriers are specialized. 14 He interprets these findings as evidence that increases in asset specificity lead to longer term contracts. "The protective safeguards to which I refer normally take on one or more of three forms. Partnerships and preferred supplier agreements are examples of the third possibility.
B. Flexibility, Adjustment Clauses, and Breach
As we have stressed above, it is crucial to incorporate flexibility into long-term contracts,. The sort of flexibility that can be built into contracts includes, among other things, adjustment clauses for price or quantity and clauses that make breach easier.
Moreover, flexibility is related to duration in the sense that shorter contracts are more flexible. Not surprisingly then, studies of the use of adjustment clauses in formal contracts have been cast mainly in terms of TCE.
Provisions for price adjustment in contracts can take many forms. Most schemes, however, can be classified as either redetermination or renegotiation mechanisms, where the former specifies a formula and the latter specifies a process.
which favors renegotiation, and freedom from opportunism, which favors redetermination. As conditions are apt to change more during the life of a longer-term contract, TCE predicts that such contracts will include terms that contain more flexible adjustment clauses. Crocker and Masten assess that choice empirically in the context of natural gas contracts and find that flexible adjustment (renegotiation) is indeed more apt to be chosen in longer duration contracts. 18 However, conditional on contract length, they find no evidence that increases in quasi rents or in market volatility affect the choice of adjustment mechanism.
In their study of contracts between producers and consumers of petroleum coke, Goldberg and Ericson find that over 90% of the contracts contained some form of adjustment mechanism. 19 Moreover, those mechanisms ranged from price indexing based on crude-oil prices, to renegotiation when that price was above or below some limits, to negotiation at fixed periods. After 1973, however, when the volatility of the market increased markedly, indexing clauses that were meant to be in force for the duration of the contract were replaced by renegotiation clauses. These authors also found that, after 1973, the period between price changes fell substantially and termination became easier. This evidence is very supportive of transaction cost arguments. 12 to market prices. 20 He found that, since most coal contracts were indexed to cost factors, in periods of stable or predictable growth in demand, contract prices were relatively flexible to changing cost conditions, and thus contractual relationships did not break down. When demand turned down, however, the market price for coal was reduced and substantial deviations between market and contract prices arose. In other words, the contract prices and associated pricing rules did not track changes in market conditions well. Nevertheless, in spite of unfavorable conditions for buyers, most long-term contracts remained in effect. In some cases, parties were able to renegotiate their contracts, relying either on scheduled re-opener provisions or changed quantity commitments. But this occurred because the contract conditions permitted it. In general, the formal contract terms remained binding, that is, with clear contractual promises, litigation and breach were the exception, not the rule. One can interpret this finding as evidence that contract restrictions were chosen efficiently.
A large segment of the literature on adjustment clauses also attempts to distinguish between efficiency and market-power enhancing effects of contract flexibility. The most favored nation (MFN) clause, which guarantees buyers (sellers) the lowest (highest) price that is offered to others in a region, is perhaps the most studied. 14 The effect of take-or-pay provisions, which obligate buyers to pay for a contractually specified minimum quantity, called a take percentage, even when delivery is not taken, has also been studied. With those provisions, flexibility increases as take percentages fall, but protection of specific investments also declines, creating a tension between these two goals. Various explanations for the existence of take-or pay provisions (e.g., risk sharing) have been proposed. Relying on transaction-cost arguments, Masten and Crocker suggest instead that they provide an efficient means for contract breach. 23 They test this hypothesis in natural-gas markets. Specifically, they explain take percentages as functions of buyer and seller numbers and find that take percentages fall (flexibility increases) when sellers are few and buyers are many. These results are consistent with an efficiency rationale, since both factors raise the alternative value of gas reserves and make breach more desirable.
Finally, Mulherin, who also argues that take-or-pay and MFN clauses are efficiency rather than market-power enhancing in natural-gas markets, provides empirical evidence consistent with the idea that the use of those clauses is related to bilateral contracting hazards, as suggested by TCE. 
C. Vertical Restraints
The evidence above suggests that many aspects of contracts can be explained using transaction cost arguments, and thus that there can be reasonable efficiency rationales for many contractual terms. In particular, that evidence -combined with numerous studies where authors show that the choice of vertical integration can also be explained by efficiency motives -suggests that vertical arrangements in procurement and distribution are not adopted for market power, reasons. However, we have looked mainly at restrictive clauses that have not been the primary focus of antitrust policy. We now turn to restrictions that have been viewed less favorably, restrictions that are known as vertical restraints (VR), to see if our assessment changes.
Williamson claims that, with a few exceptions involving tight oligopolies or dominant firms, vertical restraints are adopted to enhance efficiency. 25 Our analysis of the empirical literature on vertical restraints below confirms this claim.
Many empirical analyses of vertical restraints examine their effects on various outcomes, such as prices or profits, as a way of assessing whether they serve anticompetitive or efficiency objectives. In addition, some studies attempt to determine why and when they are used by analyzing where they occur most. We begin with a discussion of some of the motives for employing VR, which is followed by a few examples of the use and consequences of the use of specific restraints.
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Vertical restraints most often arise in retail settings, with the upstream firm or manufacturer typically restricting its downstream firm or retailers' choices. 26 We discuss why a manufacturer might want to do this from both efficiency and market power points of view.
Many of the efficiency enhancing motives for using VR are based on the idea of aligning incentives between manufacturer and retailer. Indeed, when those two links in the vertical chain are independent firms, each has its own objectives, and those objectives can diverge. In particular, retailers might want to pursue what Williamson calls subgoals, where subgoal pursuit refers to efforts to promote local or private goals at the possible expense of global or system objectives. 27 Fortunately, this problem can often be overcome or lessened through the use of vertical restraints.
One important efficiency motive, retailer free riding, is a classic case of subgoal pursuit. Specifically, manufacturers who invest in improving retail outlets, promoting retail products, or training outlet managers might worry that retailers who also sell competitors' brands will free ride on those investments. For example, investment in retail facilities enhances sales of not only own brands but also of the brands of rivals.
Manufacturers might therefore worry that, for example, retailers will encourage customers to switch to a rival brand that has a lower price ---thereby making the sale easier ---or that has a higher retail margin ---thereby making the sale privately more profitable. Exclusive dealing resolves this problem by making it impossible for the retailer to propose an alternative brand to customers. In this context, exclusive dealing is 26 We use the term manufacturer broadly to include franchisors, who do not 'manufacture' products.
17 a mechanism that enables upstream firms to protect their investments against potential retailer opportunism. Furthermore, in its absence, potentially profitable investments might not be undertaken.
Alternatively, dealer services at the point of sale can enhance the demand for a manufacturer's product. However, the goodwill that is generated by good service at one outlet can cause some customers to purchase the product from a rival retailer. It is often claimed that vertical restraints can strengthen retail cartels (e.g., minimum RPM can enforce a higher retail price). However, we have little to say about this since it does not explain why manufacturers would want a high retail price.
Vertical restraints can also facilitate manufacturer cartels. For example, uniform RPM (i.e., setting retail prices that are the same for all retailers) combined with uniform wholesale prices can enhance cartel stability. In particular, it makes it more difficult for manufacturers to grant selective price cuts to retailers, a practice that is associated with cartel breakdown. Furthermore, rival manufacturers can interpret retail price changes as reflecting manufacturer rather than retailer intent.
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The main worry of antitrust authorities when it comes to vertical restraints, however, is the possibility that their use will foreclose entry by competitors at some level of the vertical chain. For example, a manufacturer that establishes a retail network that is governed by exclusive dealing and that involves most retailers might prevent competitors 19 from gaining access to customers at a reasonable cost, if at all. This in turn could prevent entry of rival manufacturers and perhaps even lead rivals to exit. 30 This argument, however, requires that entry into retailing be costly due to, for example, economies of scale or a scarcity of good locations. Exclusive dealing, which has sometimes been referred to as vertical integration by contract, is the form of restraint for which foreclosure arguments are most frequently made.
In the end, if vertical restraints are used to lessen competition at some level of the vertical structure through foreclosing or disadvantaging rivals, prices to consumers should be higher, quantities sold smaller, and consumer choice more limited than they would be in the absence of such restraints. Williamson claims that this is unlikely unless certain structural conditions exist in the industry (e.g., tight oligopolies or dominant firms). 31 Otherwise we should look for the efficiencies that motivate the parties to a contract.
From a policy point of view, it is important to determine which motives prevail.
In other words, are VR adopted mainly for efficiency reasons, while in other contexts manufacturers, including high-end electronics and fashion firms, have successfully implemented minimum pricing requirements.
Incidence of vertical restraints or where they occur
Ippolito 
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can influence the quality of the final good or the customer's experience in important ways. Here again, manufacturer controlled pricing can alleviate the fundamental incentive alignment problem that efficiency motives and TCE emphasize. Yet another set of (mostly franchising) cases seems well explained by concerns over vertical sales-effort externalities. She concludes that collusion is not the primary explanation for the RPM practices that were prosecuted during this period.
Heide et al., for their part, focus on exclusive dealing, which historically has not been treated as harshly as RPM by the antitrust authorities. 42 As a result, they were able to obtain survey data that they use to examine what leads manufacturers to adopt exclusive dealing in their contracts with distributors. They found that manufacturers who were more concerned that their promotional efforts, training, or general support of distributors might benefit their competitors were much more likely to adopt exclusive dealing arrangements. On the other hand, when it was difficult for manufacturers to assess whether their dealers sold other manufacturers' products or when manufacturers perceived that their customers had a preference for multi-product distribution, they were less likely to rely on exclusive dealing. Again, these results are consistent with efficiency arguments for employing the restraints, in particular, with the need to curb subgoal pursuit by the individual parties as emphasized by Williamson. changes as evidence that exclusive territories were used to induce desired service and advertising levels. Given the small number of studies, it is difficult to make definitive claims about robust empirical regularities. This is particularly true because the studies also suffer from various econometric issues (particularly the identification problem) and because may of the findings concerning wellbeing are ambiguous. Nevertheless, the results are quite striking. In particular Studies of effects of government mandated vertical restraints, in contrast, show that such restraints systematically reduce consumer wellbeing or at least do not improve it. The evidence suggests instead that when dealers or consumer groups convince the government to impose such restraints, usually to "redress" the unfair treatment that they allege to be suffering, the consequences are higher prices, higher costs, shorter hours of operation, and lower consumption as well as lower upstream profits.
Effects of vertical restraints or what they do
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In sum, while there are clearly limitations to the set of available studies in terms of techniques used, industry coverage, and ability to interpret the findings, the empirical evidence is consistent and convincing. Combined with evidence on where VRs are found, needed lest subgoal pursuit by the individual parts destroy the viability of the system."
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The logical implication, as he suggests, is not that their use should never be questioned, but that the presumption should not be that they are detrimental to consumers. In particular, " [v] ertical market restrictions should be assumed to be efficiency-enhancing unless specific structural characteristics exist within the industry.
[…] Absent the existence of a dominant firm or a tight oligopoly within an industry, vertical restrictions of all kinds, exclusive dealing included, should be assumed to promote transaction costs economies." 49 From our perspective, the current rule-of-reason approach, combined with ''safe harbors'' for manufacturers with low market shares, seems more than justified based on this evidence.
Conclusion
Our goal in this paper has been to show how transaction cost economics, and in particular Oliver Williamson's contributions to that body of knowledge, have informed empirical analyses of contracts and contracting practices. We eschewed the vast and supportive empirical literature on the make-or-buy decision covered elsewhere in favor of the literature on inter-firm contracts, focusing in particular on vertical market restrictions.
We discuss not only the restrictions that have been studied most via transaction cost lenses, but also those that have been the focus of antitrust. The empirical literature that we summarize is highly supportive of transaction cost arguments, not because we only 48 Williamson, supra note 5, at. 992.
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selected supportive studies but because support is pervasive. Perhaps more important, the empirical literature reveals that efficiency enhancing rather than market-power strengthening motives explain most of the restrictive clauses found in inter-firm contracts. As Williamson remarked, not only was a market power argument for the use of various contracting practices too easy, "since any inventive economist could always discover some monopoly purpose, however remote or insubstantial, lurking somewhere, but it discouraged efforts to investigate whether the business practice in question had other origins (as well or instead)." 50 Nevertheless, one should view much of the evidence with caution. Indeed, some of the studies were published several decades ago, and some of them do not satisfy the econometric standards that tend to prevail today. Having said this, taken together the studies point in the one direction --the direction of efficiency.
As we have discussed elsewhere, there is also strong support in the empirical literature for the idea that property rights and agency considerations matter. 51 However, as Williamson put it "[t]o ownership and incentive alignment, therefore, transaction cost economics adds the proposition that the ex post support institutions of contracts matter." This is also clearly reinforced by the data.
A recurring theme in Williamson's writings is that governance modes and contracts are discrete alternatives among which contracting parties choose. None is perfect for the task, but each will be a better match in some circumstances. While we find the evidence compelling, it is clearly not sufficient. Indeed, the paucity of empirical studies can be contrasted with the abundance of theoretical articles that have been written on the effects of vertical restraints in particular and vertical market restrictions more generally. Nevertheless, as we have stressed elsewhere, 53 we endorse the idea that, faced with a vertical market restriction, the burden of evidence should be placed on competition authorities to demonstrate that the arrangement is harmful.
Moreover, there should be safe havens, based on for example market shares, that allow firms in workably competitive industries to feel safe from prosecution when they adopt restrictive clauses in their contracts.
52 Williamson, 1992, at 191-192 53 Lafontaine & Slade supra note 2.
